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ABSTRACT
All security and non-security equipment in a IT infrastruc-
ture has to be consistent with the conguration of the en-
tire IT infrastructure. System management tools are used
to manage contemporary IT infrastructures in an eÆcient
and secure manner, and ensure its conguration is consis-
tent and correct. System conguration tools achieve this by
using a central conguration model from which all congura-
tion is derived. The central conguration model determines
the conguration of the infrastructure and needs to be pro-
tected against unauthorised access and changes. In large
IT infrastructures there are multiple administrators. Each
manages an aspect of the infrastructure and thus requires
access to the central model. We propose an approach that
enforces access control on the changes that are made to the
conguration model. Our approach also includes a method
to enforce complex authorisation workows on conguration
model updates in federated infrastructures. We developed
a prototype that transforms low level textual updates, to
updates to the model. This transformation enables access
control at the same abstraction level as the conguration
model. The rst results of this work have been evaluated
and published. In this position paper we argue for further
research on securing conguration models and applying ac-
cess control on updates to the conguration model.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection|
Access control, Authentication, Information ow controls;
C.2.3 [Computer - Communication Networks]: Net-
work Operations|Network management ; C.2.4 [Computer
- Communication Networks]: Distributed Systems|Dis-
tributed applications
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1. INTRODUCTION
A contemporary IT infrastructure consists of hundreds or
thousands of devices. Devices can be security appliances
such as rewalls or authentication servers, network equip-
ment, all types of servers and end-user desktops and lap-
tops. All these devices need to be congured to function as
one infrastructure. To ensure the infrastructure works cor-
rectly and is secure, the conguration of each device needs
to be consistent with the intended conguration of the in-
frastructure. Responsibilities and expertise in system ad-
ministration teams are also not mapped on devices but on
subsystems that span the entire infrastructure. For example
logging or DNS which needs to be congured on each ma-
chine. This means that every system administrator requires
access to all devices.
Figure 1: System conguration tool architecture.
System management tools try to solve the conguration
problem by deriving the conguration for each device in the
infrastructure from a central conguration model [1]. This
model is stored in a repository and is modied by the sys-
tem administration team, as shown in Figure 1. This model
contains the desired conguration of the infrastructure. A
software agent responsible for the management of a device,
compares the current conguration of the device with the
desired conguration and makes any necessary changes [4].
The central conguration model eliminates redundancies in
the conguration specication, ensuring the conguration of
each device is consistent with the conguration of the entire
infrastructure. For example, the hostname of the logserver
has to be represented only once in the model, although each
device required to use that logserver.
Changes to the central conguration model can result in
changes made to all devices in the infrastructure. Therefore
access to the conguration model implies control over the
infrastructure. In small infrastructures with only a hand-
ful system administrators all or nothing access control and
authorisation can be suÆcient. In large infrastructure with
large teams of system administrators or possibly federated
administration ne grained access control is required.
In this position paper we argue for further research in
securing a conguration model in large infrastructures with
complex federated administration. Systemmanagement tools
are necessary to eÆciently manage a large infrastructure and
to make sure that all devices comply to the policy. This ap-
proach requires a central model that needs to be accessible
to a lot of people, but requires tight access control because
unauthorised changes can have serious consequences. To
manage infrastructures in a cost eective and eÆcient man-
ner, system management tools that use a central congura-
tion model are required. But without further advancement
in the state of the art of access control for system manage-
ment tools, implementing them will introduce serious secu-
rity threats because of this central conguration model.
Many system management tools use a textual input in the
form of source code to represent the conguration model [9].
The current state of the art in access control on this input
uses le and directory permissions from the operating sys-
tem or the repository where the source input is stored. We
developed a language agnostic approach that analyses the
changes made to the textual representation of the congu-
ration model and transforms the changes into operations on
the entities that are represented in the conguration model.
Because low level text changes are transformed to opera-
tions on the conguration model, access control rules are
expressed at the same abstraction level as the conguration
model. We prototyped this approach, applied it on a simple
conguration model and evaluated in two case studies [15].
In the next section we discuss related work on access con-
trol in systems management. In section 3 we provide a brief
overview of our approach. Future work and a discussion is
provided in section 4.
2. RELATED WORK
State of the art of system conguration tools use a declar-
ative model, have various levels of integration with ver-
sion control systems and dierent granularity of access con-
trol [2,5,8,10,11]. For workow enforcement of changes very
limited work is available [5, 12].
BCFG2 [10], Cfengine [3], LCFG [2] and Puppet [12] all
recommend to use version control repositories. Only BCFG2
provides basic integration for version control and it is only
used for reporting purposes. Cfengine and Puppet suggest
using branches and tags to create multiple environments to
support some sort of workow. For example, for testing,
production and development environments. They are not
able to enforce a workow through these environments upon
updates.
Devolved Management of Distributed Infrastructure with
Quattor [7] describes how several European grid infrastruc-
tures manage large distributed infrastructures with sites un-
der dierent administrative domains. One of the problems
with their current system is the inability to enforce ne-
grained authorization. They handle this problem by mod-
ularizing the conguration specication using namespaces
that the compiler enforces in the le name. This allows the
version repository to enforce access control on le names.
But the specication in one namespace can still access other
namespaces, thus bypassing the access control of the version
repository.
Machination [11] provides ne-grained access control based
on the manipulation primitives of the XML based input lan-
guage. Although at a higher level than providing access
based on the le names, there is still an abstraction gap be-
tween the conguration specication and the access control.
The manipulation primitives express what can be changed
in the XML input and do not directly express what can be
changed in the input specication.
PoDIM [8] includes rules to lter statements before they
are applied to the network. These rules are specied at
the same abstraction level as the source and apply to the
statements in the source specication. However, there are
no facilities to enforce a workow. The specication becomes
invalid and cannot be deployed after a change is added that
depends on a change that is not yet approved.
Most tools rely on the coarse-grained access control avail-
able in version control repositories. Some tools, such as
Machination [11], provide very ne-grained access control
but in function of the XML representation of the congura-
tion model and not the entities in the conguration model.
PoDIM [8] oers ltering of statements at the same ab-
straction level as the specication but lacks integration with
workow enforcement, thus making it hard to use. Cfengine
[5] and Puppet [12] do include provisions to use dierent
branches of a version control repository for dierent stages
in deployment in the same conguration server, but cannot
enforce workows on updates between these stages.
3. AUTHORISATIONOFCONFIGURATION
MODEL UPDATES
The conguration model used by a system management
tool is built from an input in the form of textual source code.
This source input is stored on a lesystem or in a repository
that uses version tracking. Access control and authorisation
in the state of the art is based on operations performed on
the les and directories. In state of the art system manage-
ment tools there is often no link between the le path and
the parts of the conguration model represented in the le.
Version control systems use di-like algorithms [14] that op-
erate on at les to generate changes between two versions
of a le. Di algorithms detect changed lines and produce
a list of insert and remove line operations. Applying access
control on these operations does not make much sense. The
operations are highly syntax dependant and there is only a
weak link between the insert and remove operations and the
conguration model.
In large infrastructures updates are never applied directly
to the production infrastructure. Depending on the contents
Figure 2: Updating the conguration model using access control.
of the update or the person that produced the update, dif-
ferent authorisations can be required. For example: 1. all
changes from junior administrators need to be reviewed and
approved by a senior administrator 2. the scenario in Fig-
ure 2 where a change needs to be approved by a manager
3. all changes to the production infrastructure outside main-
tenance windows require approval by two managers 4. in a
federated infrastructure changes to the backbone network
need to be approved by the management of each of the
administrative domains Existing system management tools
and access control solutions provide no support for these
complex workows that need to be enforced on model up-
dates.
Our approach [15] transforms the updates on the cong-
uration model by comparing the current and the new ver-
sion of the input source. It compiles the two versions to
an abstract syntax tree [13]. An edit script is generated
that transforms the old AST to the AST of the new ver-
sion [6]. This process is represented in Figure 3. Because we
are working on the AST, we know the semantics of changes
made to the nodes in the abstract syntax tree. Therefore the
edit script can be transformed to operations on entities that
exist in the conguration model. With this approach, access
control rules can be expressed in function of operations on
the entities in the conguration model.
For audit purposes the conguration model is often stored
in version controlled repositories. These repositories record
the change, the user that made the change and a possible
log message. In our prototype changes to this repository are
digitally signed with the private key of the administrator.
During generation of the edit script and the transformation
of the edit script, the owner of each entity and the author of
each change is tracked. The owner of an entity is the user
that added or modied the entity. This ownership and au-
thor information is also exposed to the access control rules.
We enforce update workows by using distributed version
control repositories. Each system administrator that makes
changes to the conguration model has his own repository.
Distributed version control repositories assign a unique iden-
tier to each change based on the contents of the change. To
support enforcing of update workows, a change is autho-
Figure 3: The access control component and the
dierent stages during access control checks.
rised by the owner of a key by signing this unique identi-
er and including it as an update in the repository. Access
control rules can include the authorisation of a third party
before an update is allowed. Because each distributed ver-
sion control repository can have its own set of access control
rules, very exible update workows can be enforced.
Figure 2 represents a possible scenario supported by our
prototype [15]. A system administrator makes a change that
is allowed in his repository but it requires a approval by
a manager to push the change into the repository for the
production infrastructure. The sysadmin requests the man-
ager to review his change. The manager reviews the change
and approves it by signing the identier of the change. The
sysadmin can now push his change to the production repos-
itory together with the signature of the manager.
4. FUTURE WORK
The main focus of our future work is on an access con-
trol language that is both expressive enough and powerful
enough. In our prototype [15] we transformed model up-
dates into operations on conguration model. This results
in operations to apply access control on entities that are at
the same abstraction level as the entities in the conguration
model. We used an access control language that matches the
operations on the conguration model using regular expres-
sions. Because the access control language is not integrated
with the conguration model it can not take full advantage
of the higher abstraction operations. For example using the
typing information of the entities that are operated upon.
This results in very complex access control rules in our pro-
totype. We think a more powerful access control language is
also based on pattern matching but with better integration
with the conguration model.
Because the focus of this work was on transforming the
changes to a higher abstraction level and enforcing update
workows, we did not evaluate existing access control lan-
guages and access control models. In our prototype we ap-
plied a simple role based access control model. Further re-
search is required to evaluate existing access control lan-
guages and models in a system management context.
We validated our approach on a simple conguration mod-
elling language. When the language becomes more complex
with more language constructs, transforming the edit scripts
will require priority rules. An abstract syntax tree does not
represent all relations that exist in the language because it
only models a parent-child and sibling relation. Two opera-
tions on the conguration model generate two sets of changes
on the AST's that are possibly not disjunct. When the edit
script is transformed this could result in other operations on
the conguration model than the one that was actually per-
formed. A graph can contain more relations than an AST.
Using existing graph matching algorithms edit scripts that
are less ambiguous can be generated.
5. CONCLUSION
Systemmanagement tools are required to manage contem-
porary IT infrastructures in an eÆcient and secure manner.
These tools use a conguration model that is used to derive
all conguration in the infrastructure. The current state of
the art does not provide suÆcient access control and au-
thorization mechanisms to deploy system management tools
without introducing a serious security threat. We provide a
rst solution and a prototype that addresses some of these
issues but further research is required. As a consequence we
argue for increased focus on securing conguration models
used in system management tools.
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